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For Those Who Do Not Speak: Protecting Class 
Arbitration as the Last Collective-Action  
Option for Women 
Jennifer L. Bame

 
I write for those women who do not speak, for those 
who do not have a voice because they were so terrified, 
because we are taught to respect fear more than ourselves. 
We’ve been taught that silence would save us, but it won’t. 
         —Audre Lorde1 
INTRODUCTION 
Women have come to represent a substantial majority of the 
working poor in the United States.
2
 On the whole, women earn less 
 
  B.A., English, B.A., Sociology (2006), University of Florida; M.F.A., Poetry Writing 
(2009), Columbia University; J.D. (2014), Washington University School of Law in St. Louis. 
Sincerest thanks to Professors Marion Crain, Barbara Flagg, Peggy Smith, and Karen Tokarz, 
for their guidance and expertise. Thanks also to friends and family, especially my husband 
William Payne. All errors are my own. 
 1. 1934–92. CONVERSATIONS WITH AUDRE LORDE 90 (Joan Wylie Hall ed., 2004) 
(reprinted from BLACK WOMEN WRITERS AT WORK 100–16 (Claudia Tate ed., 1985)). 
 2. Marion Crain, Confronting the Structural Character of Working Women’s Economic 
Subordination: Collective Action vs. Individual Rights Strategies, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 26 
(1994) [hereinafter Crain, Collective Action] (citing Jennifer M. Gardner & Diane E. Herz, 
Working and Poor in 1990, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1990, at 20, 21) (“The vast majority of 
working women are poor, and women are joining the ranks of the working poor at higher rates 
than men.”).  
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money than men,
3
 receive fewer benefits,
4
 and suffer greater 
discrimination in the workplace.
5
 In addition, women serve as the 
primary caregivers in the majority of households.
6
 Collective action 
strategies can help women bargain for increased workplace benefits
7
 
and demand management address predominantly women-centered 
employment issues, like sexual harassment and family leave.
8
  
The decline of unionization
9
 and the increasing difficulty of class 
certification
10
 have severely limited collective action options for 
women. With the rise of Mutual Arbitration Agreements (MAAs),
11
 
 
 3. Pay Equity and Discrimination, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. (2010), 
http://www.iwpr.org/initiatives/pay-equity-and-discrimination (Women earn 77 cents for every 
dollar a man earns.). “Women of color suffer from an even more severe gap. According to the 
National Partnership for Women and Families, African American women and Latinas in the 
United States are paid $18,817 and $23,298 less than non-Hispanic white men yearly, 
respectively. That’s 64 cents and 55 cents for every dollar a man earns.” How Pay Inequality 
Hurts Women of Color, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (2014), http://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/labor/report/2013/04/09/59731/how-pay-inequity-hurts-women-of-color/. 
 4. Women are almost twice as likely to work part time as men. See Women’s 
Employment during the Recovery, U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/ 
reports/femalelaborforce/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2014). The majority of common leave benefits, 
including retirement plans, holiday/vacation paid time off, jury duty, personal leave, sick leave, 
and funeral/bereavement leave, are not required by federal law, and are instead offered to full-
time employees as part of an employer’s compensation and benefits package. Does My Business 
Have to Provide Part-Time Employees with Benefits?, U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N (Jan. 9, 2013), 
http://www.sba.gov/community/blogs/community-blogs/business-law-advisor/does-my-business- 
have-provide-part-time-employe. 
 5. ABC NEWS/WASH. POST, ONE IN FOUR U.S. WOMEN REPS. WORKPLACE 
HARASSMENT 1 (Nov. 16, 2011), available at http://www.langerresearch.com/uploads/1130a2 
WorkplaceHarassment.pdf [hereinafter WORKPLACE HARASSMENT] (One in four women have 
experienced workplace harassment, compared to one in ten men.). 
 6. Who are Family Caregivers?, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (2014), http://www.apa.org/pi/ 
about/publications/caregivers/faq/statistics.aspx (“The percentage of . . . caregivers who are 
women range from 59 percent to 75 percent . . . .”). 
 7. See, e.g., THALIA KIDDER, OXFAM INT’L, RESEARCHING WOMEN’S COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (Feb. 1, 2013), available at http://policy-
practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/womens-collective-action-findings-and-recommendations-
294502 (finding women working in groups earned more money and had more decision-making 
power than women not in groups); With Union, Street Vendors, Bidi Rollers No Longer 
Invisible in India, SOLIDARITY CTR. (Mar. 6, 2014), http://solidaritycenter.org/content.asp? 
contentid=1815. 
 8. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 9. See Mark J. Perry, Union Membership: Good News, Bad News, CARPE DIEM (Feb. 11, 
2010), http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2010/02/union-membership-good-news-bad-news.html (“Union 
membership as a percent of all U.S. workers is close to an all-time low of 12.3% in 2009.”).  
 10. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 11. “Since the US Supreme Court’s [AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 321 (2011)] 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/12
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employees are contracting away their right to litigate workplace 
grievances, agreeing instead to resolve disputes through alternative 
methods, such as arbitration.
12
 Women can utilize class arbitration to 
collectively address workplace inequalities, much as they would 
through class action litigation and unionization. Yet, like 
unionization, class arbitration has come under attack from big 
business interests, intent on preventing worker empowerment.
13
 
In January of 2012, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or 
the “Board”)14 heard the case of D.R. Horton and Michael Cuda (“DR 
Horton”), and ruled that an employer may not require, as a condition 
of employment, an employee sign an MAA waiving that employee’s 
right to file joint, class, or collective claims addressing employee 
wages, hours, or working conditions.
15
 The NLRB held such claims 
were protected as “concerted activity” under § 7 of the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
16
 The Board explained that collective 
action seeking to redress workplace inequalities—in the courtroom or 
 
decision in 2001, the use of mandatory arbitration agreements by employers has increased 
greatly, as have the decisions enforcing such agreements against employees.” Arbitration 
Agreements, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.workplacefairness.org/ 
arbitration. 
 12. “[E]mployers often condition valuable benefits—such as getting or keeping a job—on 
your ‘agreement’ to submit claims which otherwise could have been presented to the public 
court system to arbitration.” Id. 
 13. See, e.g., Ucilia Wang, Why Target’s Anti-Union Video is No Joke, GUARDIAN, Mar. 
31, 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/target-anti-union-
video-cheesy-but-effective (“Target’s latest anti-union video highlights how effective corporate 
campaigns have been in undermining unionization efforts.”). 
 14. The NLRB is “an independent federal agency vested with the power to safeguard 
employee’ rights to organize. . . . The agency also acts to prevent and remedy unfair labor 
practices committed by private sector employers and unions” by investigating charges of unfair 
labor practices, facilitating settlements, deciding cases, and enforcing orders. The NLRB was 
created under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1935).  
 15. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012). Michael Cuda worked for D.R. Horton, a 
public corporation that builds residential homes. As a condition of Cuda’s employment, D.R. 
Horton required Cuda sign a Mutual Arbitration Agreement that required all employment-
related disputes be handled by individual and not class arbitration. The right to judicial 
litigation was waived. Cuda filed an unfair labor practice charge under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 8 (1938), alleging D.R. Horton violated the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158, by 
precluding class arbitration. Id. at 1. 
 16. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1947). “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”  
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through arbitration—was exactly what Congress intended to protect 
when it adopted the broad language of § 7.
17
 The NLRB emphasized 
that utilizing class arbitration “is not peripheral but central to the 
Act’s purposes.”18  
Following the NLRB’s decision, the case was appealed to the 
Fifth Circuit, where, in a two to one decision, the court largely denied 
enforcement of the NLRB ruling, ostensibly sounding the death knell 
for class arbitration.
19
 It is unknown whether the NLRB will appeal 
the Fifth Circuit’s ruling to the Supreme Court,20 although a realistic 
 
 17. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 380 U.S. 300, 313 (1965) (“A primary 
purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to redress the perceived imbalance of economic 
power between labor and management.”).  
 18. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 3 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 
U.S. 9 (1962)). 
 19. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013), http://www. 
ilr.cornell.edu/law/events/upload/Horton-v-NLRB-Court-of-Appeals.pdf. For a review of the 
arguments and analysis that led to the ruling, see Fifth Circuit Rejects NLRB’s Ban on Class 
Action Waivers, MORGAN LEWIS (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/ 
LEPG_LF_CourtRejectsNLRBBanonClassActionWaivers_05dec13 (“Only when an arbitration 
agreement is unenforceable ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity,’ or when Congress 
has given a clear command in another statute to override the FAA, should an arbitration 
agreement not be enforced by the federal courts.” The court found neither exception applied.). 
 20. On June 26, 2014, the Supreme Court, in N.L.R.B v. Noel Canning, unanimously held 
that President Obama’s 2012 recess appointments to the NLRB were invalid. 573 U.S. __ 
(2014). In doing so, the Court appears to have invalided the NLRB’s DR Horton decision. See 
Jeffrey D. Polsky, 9 Key Decisions Invalidated by the Supreme Court’s Noel Canning Decision, 
MONDAQ (July 1, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/324276/employee+rights+ 
labour+relations/9+Key+NLRB+Decisions+Invalidated+by+the+Supreme+Courts+Noel+Cann
ing+Decision. However, it is unknown whether the new Board will readopt its pre-Noel 
Canning decisions. Id. Rulings post-Noel Canning indicate the Board may continue to enforce 
its DR Horton decision. See, e.g., Steven M. Swirsky et al., Two for One: Noel Canning and 
D.R. Horton Continue to Generate Waves at the NLRB, MGMT. MEMO (July 21, 2014), http:// 
www.managementmemo.com/2014/07/21/two-for-one-noel-canning-and-d-r-horton-continue-
to-generate-waves-at-the-nlrb/. “In Fuji Food Products, a decision issued on July 15, 2014, 
NLRB Administrative Law Judge Jeffrey D. Wedekind held that former NLRB Board Member 
Craig Becker’s recess appointment was valid and that Fuji Food Product’s arbitration 
agreement, which required employees to arbitrate all federal claims, was unlawful. Specifically, 
the ALJ concluded that Member Becker’s recess appointment was valid under Noel Canning 
because unlike the others appointments made by President Obama, his occurred during a 17-day 
intra-session recess, during which no sessions of the Senate (pro-forma or otherwise) took 
place. With regards to D.R. Horton, the ALJ acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals had rejected the Board’s conclusion upon which his decision was based, but he 
explained that because of the doctrine of non-acquiescence, he was ‘required to follow Board 
precedent unless and until it is reversed by the Supreme Court.’” Id. As such, for the purposes 
of this Note, the author assumes the DR Horton decision will continue to be enforced and that 
appeal of the Fifth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court is possible.  
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assessment of the current Court makes an NLRB victory there seem 
improbable. The majority has already upheld arbitration agreements 
that preclude class arbitration in a consumer context.
21
 It is unlikely 
that shifting the discussion to a labor and employment context will 
create a meaningful distinction for the Court, which tends to defer to 
a company’s “business judgment” in deciding employment 
disputes.
22
 However, continuing uncertainty on the question of an 
employee’s right to class arbitration may compel the Court to hear 
the case and clarify the law.
23
  
This Note argues that the protection of class arbitration as a 
concerted activity should be upheld by the Supreme Court under § 7 
of the NLRA, because it is an especially important tool for equalizing 
the power of women in the workplace. Through the preservation of 
class arbitration, women will be more successful in enforcing their 
workplace rights.  
Part I of this Note reviews how the division of labor along gender 
lines has created devastating economic consequences for women, 
leading women to constitute a large majority of the working poor in 
America. It explores the underlying causes of this gendered division 
 
 21. See generally Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 321.  
 22. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (McDonnell 
Douglas is a landmark employment discrimination case in which the Court held that once a 
plaintiff makes her prima facie case, the employer can rebut the inference of discrimination by 
presenting a legitimate business reason for the adverse employment action. The employer has 
only a burden of production, and the proffered legitimate business reason can be a lie and still 
sufficient. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 521 (1993) (“The books are full of 
procedural rules that place the perjurer (initially, at least) in a better position than the truthful 
litigant who makes no response at all.”). See also Kevin J. Smith, U.S. Supreme Court Rulings 
in Arbitration and Employment Matters, METRO. CORP. COUNS. (Aug. 15, 2013), http:// www. 
metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/24966/us-supreme-court-rulings-arbitration-and-employment-
matters (“The United States Supreme Court continued its trend of business-friendly decision 
making in the 2012-2013 term, ruling more often than not in favor of business interests.”). 
 23. See Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., No. 21-CA-102332 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 17, 2014); see also 
McGuire Woods LLP, NLRB Judge Invalidates Arbitration Agreement without Express Class 
Action Waiver, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bb5 
d0ad4-7b7c-423a-83a0-c049624c8c00 (“The [Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc.] ruling demonstrates the 
ongoing divergence between the federal courts and the NLRB over the lawfulness of class 
action waivers in employment arbitration agreements . . . . Unless and until the Supreme Court 
weighs in on whether such waivers violate the NLRA, employees will continue to seek NLRB 
intervention as a means to preclude enforcement of class and collective action waivers. . . . 
[C]lass action waivers will continue to be an area of legal uncertainty for employers seeking to 
enforce such provisions in arbitration agreements.”). 
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of labor through the lens of divergent feminist theories. It then argues 
that, as a result of occupational sex segregation, women can benefit 
greatly from collective action as a means of addressing workplace 
grievances. Part II discusses the decline of unionization as a tool for 
collective action and rights enforcement in the workplace, and how 
the history of collective action has affected working women in 
America. Part III examines the increasing difficulty of winning class 
certification and using class action litigation as a tool to assert 
workplace rights, following Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.
24
 Part IV 
considers the use of class arbitration, how it compares to traditional 
litigation, and why it is currently at risk. This Note concludes that the 
decline of unionization and other collective-action strategies has left 
class arbitration as a last-ditch option for working women to 
collectively address workplace grievances. As such, the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in DR Horton should be reversed, and class 
arbitration should be protected in the employment context as a 
necessary form of concerted activity. 
I. WORKING WOMEN IN AMERICA 
Women now comprise a large majority of the working poor in 
America.
25
 Occupational sex segregation and “labor market hostility 
to working mothers, whose cultural roles continue to include the 
obligation to serve as primary caretakers for children,”26 make it 
difficult for women to obtain employment positions that pay well, 
provide opportunities for advancement, and ensure necessary benefits 
and protections, such as overtime pay
27
 and paid family leave.
28
 
 
 24. Supra note 10. 
 25. See Crain, Collective Action, supra note 2, at 26.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Home healthcare workers, the majority of whom are women, recently secured 
collective bargaining rights and minimum wage and overtime protections. See Melanie 
Trottman & Kris Maher, Labor Department Adds Protections for Home-Health-Care Workers, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001 
424127887323981304579081251516291502. However, a number of women-dominated 
professions are not entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2007). See, e.g., 
Exemptions to the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ 
elaws/esa/flsa/screen75.asp (farmworkers and commissioned sales employees not covered). 
 28. The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1993), does not apply to 
women who work for small businesses with less than fifty employees. Further, leave is unpaid 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/12
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While more women today are entering the labor force than in the past 
forty years,
29
 women still earn significantly less than men
30
 and still 
occupy a majority of low-paying jobs.
31
  
According to the Institute for Women’s Research, women earn 77 
cents for every dollar that men earn.
32
 The education and health 
services industries employ the most women, followed by the trade, 
transportation, and utilities sectors.
33
 Within these industries, 
elementary school teacher, nurse, home health aide, cashier, 
housekeeper, waitress, salesperson, and receptionist make up a 
disproportionate number of the careers occupied by women.
34
 And 
these are among the lowest-paying jobs in America.
35
 
A. Feminist Perspectives on Workplace Inequality 
Feminist scholars propose a number of theories as to why women 
have come to occupy the majority of low-paying jobs. Cultural 
feminists, like the psychologist Carol Gilligan, argue that a woman’s 
moral sensibility differs from that of men, and leads women to place 
greater emphasis on relationships, causing increased interdependence 
among women.
36
 According to Gilligan, women experience internal 
 
and limited to twelve weeks; and leave to care for domestic partners or siblings is not provided. 
See Family and Medical Leave Act, U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/ (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2014). 
 29. Women at Work, BUREAU LAB. STATS. (Mar. 2011), http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/ 
2011/women/ (“Women’s labor force participation rates are significantly higher today than they 
were in the 1970s.”).  
 30. Id. (Ration of Women’s to Men’s Earnings by Occupation).  
 31. Id. (Women’s Earnings and Employment by Occupation). 
 32. See Pay Equity and Discrimination, supra note 3.  
 33. See Women at Work, supra note 29 (Employment by Industry). 
 34. Id. (Women’s Earnings and Employment by Occupation).  
 35. Shan Li, Women Still Work More Low-Pay Jobs, Report on Gender Gap Finds, L.A. 
TIMES, June 13, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/13/business/la-fi-mo-
gender-gap-jobs-20130613. 
 36. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: WOMEN’S CONCEPTIONS OF 
SELF AND OF MORALITY 3 (1982), available at http://sfonline.barnard.edu/sfxxx/documents/ 
gilligan.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). But see Naomi Weisstein, Power, Resistance and 
Science, NEW POLITICS (1997), available at http://nova.wpunj.edu/newpolitics/issue22/ 
weisst22.htm (arguing that “feminist psychologists,” like Gilligan, “put forth a notion of female 
difference which, while no longer biologically based, is nevertheless essentialist, or at least 
highly decontextualized . . . they assume that female difference is fixed, rather than contingent 
on social context”). 
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conflict when faced with external pressures, torn between 
compassion for others and a desire for autonomy—between acts of 
“virtue and power.”37 If a woman speaks up about an injustice like 
low wages, she fears she is betraying her role as a compassionate 
caregiver.
38
 She is less likely than a man to object to a particular 
practice or to challenge the status quo, if doing so leads to 
alienation.
39
 She becomes particularly susceptible to suffer inequality 
where power imbalances lead to gender exploitation, as in the 
workplace.
40
  
This conception of a woman’s moral sensibility can have direct 
consequences for women in the workplace, serving to perpetuate and 
justify the movement of women into low-paying jobs. In EEOC v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., a group of employees brought a class action 
employment discrimination lawsuit against Sears, claiming women 
were disproportionately hired for non-commission, lower-paying 
jobs.
41
 In defense of its hiring practices, Sears claimed its female 
employees showed little interest in commission sales jobs, arguing 
the “interests of men and women often diverged along patterns of 
traditional male and female interest.”42 Sears insisted its female 
employees “feared or disliked the perceived ‘dog-eat-dog’ 
competition” of commission sales, preferring non-commission selling 
“because it was more enjoyable and friendly.”43 
In support of its argument, Sears called historian Rosalind 
Rosenberg to testify. Rosenberg argued a woman’s “commitment to 
the home and family internalized values predominantly relationship-
 
 37. See GILLIGAN, supra note 36, at 10. 
 38. Id. (It is “in their care and concern for others that women have both judged themselves 
and been judged.”). 
 39. Id. (“The ‘good woman’ masks assertion in evasion, denying responsibility by 
claiming only to meet the needs of others, while the ‘bad woman’ forgoes or renounces the 
commitments that bind her in self-deception and betrayal.”).  
 40. See also SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARDS A POLITICS OF PEACE 
(1989); ANN FERGUSON, BLOOD AT THE ROOT: MOTHERHOOD, SEXUALITY AND MALE 
DOMINANCE (1989). 
 41. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
 42. Id. at 1307. The EEOC countered, arguing the employment make-up was the result of 
systemic discrimination, that “women are influenced only by the opportunities presented to 
them, not by their preference,” and that women do seize “opportunities for greater income in 
nontraditional jobs” when such jobs are made available. Id. at 1314. 
 43. Id. at 1307. 
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centered rather than work-centered . . . and led women to have 
different attitudes, goals and expectations toward work than men.”44 
The majority agreed, finding “many applicants for sales jobs at Sears 
were not in fact interested in selling on commission.”45 The court 
explained that a female employee’s dislike of what she perceived as 
cut-throat competition and increased pressure deterred her from 
pursuing a commission sales jobs.
46
 Non-commission selling, on the 
other hand, was more social and friendly.
47
 Like Gilligan, the court 
endorsed a conception of women as innately more interested in 
relationships than in pursuing economic gains. 
In contrast, liberal feminists see the subordination of women not 
as the result of any innate female characteristic but as resulting from 
the systemic manipulation of the very claims espoused by cultural 
feminists. Second-wave feminist Betty Friedan articulated this view 
in her groundbreaking book The Feminine Mystique: 
Over and over women heard in voices of tradition . . . they 
could desire no greater destiny than to glory in their own 
femininity. Experts told them how to catch a man and keep 
him, how to breastfeed children and handle their toilet training, 
how to cope with sibling rivalry and adolescent rebellion; . . . 
They were taught to pity the neurotic, unfeminine, unhappy 
women who wanted to be poets or physicists or presidents. 
They learned that truly feminine women do not want careers, 
higher education, political rights . . . .
48
  
Instead of relying on traditional notions of femininity and the female 
“moral sensibility,” liberal feminists argue for personal autonomy 
 
 44. See Stephanie Riger, Comment on “Women’s History Goes to Trial: EEOC v. Sears, 
Roebuck and Company,” 13 SIGNS 897, 897 (Summer 1998), available at http://www.jstor.org/ 
discover/10.2307/3174130?uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21103399566697. 
 45. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. at 1302. On appeal, the dissent saw it differently, 
arguing, “[T]here is scarcely any recognition of the employer’s role in shaping the ‘interests’ of 
applicants . . . [L]ack of opportunity may drive lack of interest.” EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 839 F.2d 302, 361 (7th Cir. 1988). “These conclusions are of a piece with the proposition 
that women are by nature happier cooking, doing the laundry and chauffeuring the children to 
softball games than arguing appeals or selling stocks. The stereotype of women as less greedy 
and daring than men is one that the sex discrimination laws were intended to address.” Id. 
 46. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. at 1307. 
 47. Id. 
 48. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 15 (1963). 
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and choice, and view a woman’s lack of individual rights as the main 
source of inequality in the workplace.
49
 Liberal feminists advocate 
for “formal equality,” under which women are equal to men and 
entitled to the same protections.
50
 They work towards the passage of 
laws that promote equal rights, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, which forbids arbitrary employment decisions based on 
sex.
51
  
The legal consequences of a liberal feminist interpretation of 
female subordination and inequality can be seen in cases like Gilbert 
v. General Electric, where the limitations of Title VII were laid 
bare.
52
 There, the majority held that the exclusion of pregnancy leave 
from an employer’s disability plan was not discrimination based on 
 
 49. One of the major goals of the liberal feminist movement in the 1960s and 70s, during 
the civil rights movement, was the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). “In 1972, 
after 49 years of effort by supporters, Congress proposed an amendment declaring that ‘equality 
of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on 
account of sex,’ referred to hereinafter as ‘the proposed Equal Rights Amendment,’ or ‘the 
proposed ERA.’” THOMAS H. NEALE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE PROPOSED 
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: CONTEMPORARY RATIFICATION ISSUES 2 (May 21, 2013), 
available at http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/misc/CRS_2013_summary.pdf. The ERA 
has yet to be adopted. For more on the ERA, see id. 
 50. For a thorough discussion of formal equality, see Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to 
Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 209 (1998), available at http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss1/5. 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (1978) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin . . . .”). 
 52. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), in which discrimination based on pregnancy was not considered 
discrimination based on sex. This changed with the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act in 1978, which amended Title VII to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1978). However, Title VII currently fails to provide protection for lesbian 
women, because discrimination based on sexual orientation is neither covered under Title VII 
nor is it considered discrimination based on sex. See Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
523 U.S. 75 (1989) (distinguishing between discrimination based on sex and discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, and finding the latter not forbidden under federal law). This is 
likely to change in the coming years. See Macy v. Department of Justice, No. 0120120821 
(EEOC Apr. 20, 2012) (where the EEOC held that discrimination against an individual because 
that person is transgender is discrimination because of sex); Castello v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 
0520110649 (EEOC Dec. 20, 2011) (where the EEOC found claims by lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual individuals alleging sex-stereotyping did state sex discrimination claims under Title 
VII). 
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sex.
53
 In defending its rationale, the Court explained that General 
Electric’s plan was “a gender-free assignment of risks in accordance 
with normal actuarial techniques.”54 In Gilbert, the Court 
acknowledged the need to treat men and women equally, and denying 
pregnancy leave to all employees, regardless of sex, did just that.
55
  
In contrast to a liberal feminist interpretation, Marxist and radical 
feminists see the movement of women into low-paying jobs as the 
result of structural patterns inherent in capitalism and patriarchy that 
cannot be corrected by granting rights.
56
 According to Sylvia Walby, 
a radical feminist sociologist, female subordination is the result of 
patriarchy, by which men dominate women to reap both private and 
public advantages.
57
 With the onset of industrial capitalism, private 
patriarchy, which worked to exclude women from economic and 
political positions of power, transformed into public patriarchy, 
whereby women entering the labor force were segregated into low-
paying jobs.
58
 Similarly, Marxist feminists view women’s 
subordination as the natural result of capitalism, in which the 
dominant social structure is the economic exploitation of one class 
(or group) over another.
59
  
In her book Sexual Harassment of Working Women, Catherine 
MacKinnon exemplifies how “the social creation of differences, and 
the transformation of differences into social advantages and 
disadvantages,” allows society to rationally predicate inequality and 
 
 53. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134 (“While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it 
does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based 
classification . . . . Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts 
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, 
lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of 
legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical 
condition.”). 
 54. Id. at 148.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Feminist Perspectives on Class and Work, STAN. ENCYCLO. OF 
PHILO. (Oct. 12, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-class/. 
 57. See generally SYLVIA WALBY, THEORIZING PATRIARCHY (1991).  
 58. Id. at 24 (“The change from private to public patriarchy involves a change both in the 
relations between the structures and within the structures. In the private form, household 
production is the dominant structure; in the public form, it is replaced by employment and the 
state. In each form, all the remaining patriarchal structures are preset—there is simply a change 
in which are dominant.”). 
 59. Id. at 33–34. 
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economic exploitation.
60
 According to MacKinnon, women’s sexual 
differences, like their ability to become pregnant, are used by society 
to perpetuate inequality and maintain a social hierarchy in which men 
are placed firmly at the top.
61
 According to MacKinnon, decisions 
like the one in Gilbert manifest and perpetuate the structural 
hierarchy in which men dominate, serving only to reinforce “a system 
of second-class status for half of humanity.”62 To address the 
problems faced by women in the workplace, MacKinnon argues 
society must reevaluate and reinterpret how those problems are 
addressed. For example, to truly tackle sex discrimination, 
discrimination must be redefined as not only arbitrary distinctions 
based on sex but as any act that perpetuates the existing hierarchy, 
regardless of real or arbitrary differences.
63
  
While these varying feminist perspectives promote diverging 
sources of and solutions to the existence of inequality in the 
workplace, they share a common observation: workplace exploitation 
of women has become normalized. The perpetuation of stereotypes 
and the denial of rights, combined with an economic system 
dependent on inter-group hierarchies, have left women the objects of 
social and economic subordination. 
B. Collective Action Strategies for Women 
The social and economic subordination of women can be seen in 
current employment patterns, which reveal women overwhelmingly 
employed in low-wage occupations.
64
 Despite the grim statistics, 
collective action strategies can help to empower women employees.
65
 
Labor and employment law expert Marion Crain argues that 
“collective action strategies are superior to individual rights”66 in 
helping women achieve workplace equality in a number of ways. 
 
 60. CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 105 (1979). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. For a more nuanced discussion of MacKinnon’s perspective on male/female 
hierarchies, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE 
STATE (1989). 
 64. See generally Crain, Collective Action, supra note 2. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. at 26.  
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First, in the context of union collective action, “women-centered 
unions can attack sex-segregation” by bargaining for benefits that 
uniquely address the interests of women in a particular occupation—
benefits such as equal pay, paid family leave, and employer-provided 
day care.
67
 Second, collective action through unionization “distributes 
the burdens and costs of asserting women’s interests as workers 
across the organized working class.”68 Resolving disputes can be 
costly and slow; collective action can more efficiently allocate 
resources and lower costs.
69
 In some cases, collective action may be 
the only feasible option for women employees seeking to address a 
claim, given the high cost of bringing employment grievances—both 
economically and emotionally.
70
 Additionally, collective action can 
empower women to take control of their working conditions.
71
 A 
woman can become empowered by seeing herself as a member of a 
group—specifically, as one of many exploited female wage 
workers.
72
 Working together, women are awakened to their potential 
to enact change and gain necessary protections and benefits. Crain 
argues that when a woman becomes aware of what is possible 
through collective action, she is “like a new person, . . . not like that 
meek little person that worked in that office for twenty years and 
never opened [her] mouth[].”73  
II. UNIONIZATION IN DECLINE 
Unionization is on the decline,
74
 yet the success of unionization 
among low-wage workers demonstrates how collective action can 
 
 67. Id. at 31. 
 68. Id. at 32. 
 69. Id. at 27 (A collective action approach “is more equitable because it distributes the 
costs of empowering women and enforcing statutory rights over organized labor as a whole, 
rather than saddling individual women or feminist advocacy groups with those costs.”).  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 31. 
 72. Id. at 27 (Collective action “is more likely to foster self-esteem and thus enhance 
activism and enforcement of other statutory rights . . . .”). 
 73. Id. at 31 (quoting a telephone interview with anonymous female union organizer (May 
17, 1991)). 
 74. Steven Greenhouse, Labor’s Decline and Wage Inequality, ECONOMIX (Aug. 4, 2011), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/labors-decline-and-wage-inequality/. One study 
found the decline in union power and density since 1973 explained one third of the increase in 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 46:245 
 
 
increase women’s rights in the workplace.75 Through unionization, 
women can bargain collectively and counteract the imbalance of 
power that favors management.
76
 Management can exploit its power 
over employees by lowering wages, eliminating benefits, increasing 
work hours, and providing unsafe working conditions.
77
 Female 
employees can leverage their numbers to negotiate for living wages 
and increased benefits, with the union serving as their representative 
and shield against the unpredictability of management, workplace 
harassment, and employer retaliation.
78
  
The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was one of the first and 
largest labor unions in the United States, organized as an association 
of trade unions in 1886.
79
 The AFL focused mainly on working 
conditions and income, and was instrumental in securing victories for 
male and female workers.
80
 However, the AFL did not always 
 
wage inequality among men since then, and one fifth of the increased inequality among women. 
Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 AM. 
SOC. REV. 513 (2011). The study noted that from 1973 to 2007, union membership in the 
private sector dropped to 8 percent from 34 percent among men and to 6 percent from 16 
percent among women. During that time, wage inequality in the private sector increased by 
more than 40 percent. Id.  
 75. Derek Thompson, Indispensable: Why the Middle Class Needs Unions Now More 
Than Ever, THE ATLANTIC, June 12, 2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2012/06/indispensable-why-the-middle-class-needs-unions-now-more-than-ever/258 404/. 
 76. “Recent advances in trade and technology have severely exacerbated the imbalance 
between employers and employees. The emergence of the global economy has put great 
pressure on American business to reduce costs in order to compete internationally. Corporate 
reorganizations, downsizing, and a growing reliance on contingent workers increasingly 
became the norm beginning in the early 1980s. These measures, in turn, have significantly 
eroded employee job security. Similarly, modern information and communication technology 
has made capital considerably more mobile than labor. Employers can move, or threaten to 
move, production facilities to locations with lower labor costs. This mobile capacity thus 
greatly enhances the relative bargaining power of employers vis-a-vis employees.” Stephen F. 
Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical 
Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351 (2002), available at https://www.bc.edu/dam/files/schools/ 
law/lawreviews/journals/bclawr/43_2/02_TXT.htm. 
 77. See generally DAVID EDWARD O’CONNOR & CHRISTOPHER C. FAILLE, BASIC 
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES: A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS (2000). 
 78. Thompson, supra note 75.  
 79. See PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
VOL. 2: FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE A. F. OF L. TO THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN 
IMPERIALISM (1975). In 1955, the AFL merged with its longtime rival, the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO), to form the AFL-CIO, a federation in place today. The AFL has 
comprised the longest lasting and most influential labor federation in the United States. Id.  
 80. WILLIAM CLARK ROBERTS, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR: HISTORY, 
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support the right of women to unionize and initially viewed women 
as strike-breakers and low-wage labor reserves.
81
 From the founding 
of the AFL through the 1920s, women remained practically invisible 
within the union, with only two affiliated unions openly including 
women.
82
 
At the same time, however, the AFL, prompted by the Women’s 
Trade Union League,
83
 took efforts on behalf of women in support of 
protective legislation.
84
 The AFL advocated fewer work hours for 
women, but it did so based on the underlying assumption that female 
workers were weak and needed to be protected as potential child-
bearers.
85
 Most support for protective legislation for women stemmed 
from a desire to protect men’s jobs.86 If a woman’s hours could be 
limited, a man’s employment opportunities and earning potential 
could be improved.
87
 
 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, REFERENCE BOOK (1919); see also ALICE KESSLER-HARROS, OUT TO WORK: 
A HISTORY OF WAGE EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1982). 
 81. See Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage 
Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1155 (1991) [hereinafter Crain, Feminizing Unions]. Crain explains, 
“Despite rapid expansion in the number of working women in the industrial labor force between 
1897 and 1920, the AFL was able to organize no more than 1.5% of the women engaged in 
industrial occupations by the year 1910; only new organizing among garment workers was 
responsible for raising the figure by 6.6% in 1920.” Id. at 1161. For an extensive study, see R. 
MILKMAN, GENDER AT WORK (1987). 
 82. See Union 101, CALEDONIA FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL 2740 (Nov. 29, 2008), http://www. 
iaff2740.org/?zone=/unionactive/view_page.cfm&page=Union20101 (“The AFL hired its first 
female organizer, Mary Kenney O’Sullivan, only in 1892 and after releasing her after five 
months, and it did not replace her or hire another women national organizer until 1908. Women 
who organized their own unions were often turned down in bids to join the Federation, and even 
women who did join unions found them hostile or intentionally inaccessible.”). 
 83. Founded in 1903 at an AFL meeting, the League served as a liaison to the AFL and 
did most women’s union organizing in the 1900s. See NANCY SCHROM DYE, Creating A 
Feminist Alliance: Sisterhood and Class Conflict in the New York Women’s Trade Union 
League, 1903–1914, 2 FEM. STUD. 24 (1975). 
 84. See ELIZABETH ANNE PAYNE, REFORM, LABOR, AND FEMINISM: MARGARET DREIER 
ROBINS AND THE WOMEN’S TRADE UNION LEAGUE 1–3 (1988). 
 85. Id. at 143 (“An ideology of motherhood was behind the League’s programs for 
protective legislation.”). 
 86. See Crain, Feminizing Unions, supra note 81, at 1164. Quoting the national Trade 
Union’s proclamation of its ideology regarding women in the workplace, Crain states, “We 
stand for the principle . . . that it is wrong to permit any of the female sex of our country to be 
forced to work, as we believe that the man should be provided with a fair wage in order to keep 
his female relatives from going to work.” Id. 
 87. Id. 
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During the Great Depression, vital pieces of legislation were 
passed that significantly increased the ability of workers to unionize. 
In 1932, Congress passed the Norris–LaGuardia Act,88 banning the 
use of “yellow dog contracts”89 and restricting the use of court 
injunctions to end labor strikes.
90
 Shortly after, as part of his New 
Deal legislation, President Roosevelt signed into law the Wagner Act, 
also known as the NLRA,
91
 and the Fair Labors Standards Act 
(FLSA).
92
 Combined, these acts solidified the right of workers, both 
men and women, to bargain collectively, and led to a dramatic 
increase in unionization.
93
  
At the onset of World War II, an increased number of married and 
unmarried women joined the workforce due to the sudden need for 
workers.
94
 As a result, trade unions were forced to recognize equal 
 
 88. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1932). The Norris LaGuardia Act banned contracts between 
employer and employee in which the employee promised not to join a union as a condition of 
employment; barred the federal courts from issuing injunctions against nonviolent labor 
disputes; and created a positive right of noninterference by employers against workers 
joining trade unions. See New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938) 
(finding a boycott of race discrimination falls within the meaning of protected “labor disputes”).  
 89. An agreement between an employer and an employee in which the employee agrees, 
as a condition of employment, not to be a member of a labor union. See ROBERT EMMETT 
DOHERTY, INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS TERMS: A GLOSSARY 24, 36 (1989). 
 90. See Norris–LaGuardia Act of 1921, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT., http:// 
www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/federalstatutesregulationsandguidanc/pages/norris-
laguardiaactof1932.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).  
 91. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935). “Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of 
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, 
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of 
industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of 
industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, 
and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees . . . .” Id. 
 92. 29 U.S.C. § 8 (1938). Among other things, the Act set a minimum wage and 
maximum number of work hours an employee could work per week. See Jonathan Grossman, 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV., June 1978, at 22.  
 93. See Norris–LaGuardia Act of 1921, supra note 90 (“[H]igh unemployment of the 
Great Depression made it difficult for workers to express their unified preference for union 
representation. By the third year of the Depression, however, workers with jobs began to push 
for unionization anyway. Labor solidarity was borne of desperation. . . . [T]he union movement 
grew by more than 300 percent. . . . By 1941 [union membership] stood at over ten million.”); 
see also N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (finding the NLRA, 
“does not invade the constitutional rights of employers and employees”). 
 94. See Crain, Feminizing Unions, supra note 81, at 1166.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  For Those Who Do Not Speak 261 
 
 
protection for women under union contracts.
95
 This new strength of 
unions, and particularly women in unions, concerned many anti-labor 
Republicans.
96
 In 1947, Congress passed the Taft–Hartley Act, to 
mitigate the growing influence of labor unions in the workplace.
97
 
The Taft–Hartley Act drastically curtailed the economic power of 
unions, declaring the closed shop illegal
98
 and permitting workplace 
unionization only after a majority vote by employees.
99
 The Act 
forbade jurisdictional strikes
100
 and secondary boycotts,
101
 and gave 
employers the right to refuse to bargain with unions.
102
  
From its heyday in 1945, following World War II, when union 
membership peaked at 35 percent of non-agricultural workers, 
unionization has steadily declined. Today, only 12 percent of all 
 
 95. Id.  
 96. See Steven Wagner, How Did the Taft-Hartley Act Come About?, HIST. NEWS 
NETWORK (Oct. 14, 2002), http://hnn.us/articles/1036.html (“In the mid-term elections of 1946, 
the Republican Party won control of the upcoming Eightieth Congress, gaining majorities in 
both houses for the first time since 1931. . . . These freshmen congressmen were eager to 
overturn as much New Deal legislation as possible and one of their first priorities was to amend 
the Wagner Act.”). 
 97. 29 U.S.C.A. § 186 (1947). The Act passed only after overriding President Truman’s 
veto, and was known to many as the “slave-labor bill.” Wagner, supra note 96. 
 98. A form of union security agreement under which the employer agrees to 
hire union members only. Employees must remain members of the union at all times in order to 
remain employed. See DOHERTY, supra note 89, at 17. 
 99. “Even though employers are free to recognize a union without an election, in practice 
they almost always request an election . . . . Requesting an election [] gives them more time to 
lobby against unionization. . . . [T]he secret ballot isn’t so secret. . . .” Christopher Beam, Does 
Card Check Kill the Secret Ballot or Not?, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.slate.com 
/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2009/03/uncivil_union.html. “Sadly, many employers resort 
to spying, threats, intimidation, harassment and other illegal activity in their campaigns to 
oppose unions. The penalty for illegal activity, including firing workers for engaging in 
protected activity, is so weak that it does little to deter law breakers. . . . The employer has all 
the power; they control the information workers can receive, can force workers to attend anti-
union meetings during work hours, can force workers to meet with supervisors who deliver 
anti-union messages, and can even imply that the business will close if the union wins. Union 
supporters’ access to employees, on the other hand, is heavily restricted.” 153 CONG. REC. 
E260 (Feb. 5, 2007) (statement of Rep. George Miller). 
 100. A concerted refusal to work, enacted by a union to assert its members’ right to a 
particular job, and to protest the assignment of disputed work to members of another union or 
unorganized workers. See DOHERTY, supra note 89, at 20.  
 101. An industrial action by a trade union to support the strike of workers in another 
enterprise. See id at 21. 
 102. Alexander Cockburn, An Anti-Labor Day that Lives in Infamy: How Many Democrats 
Voted for Taft-Hartley?, COUNTERPUNCH (Sept. 2004), http://www.counterpunch.org/2004/09/ 
06/how-many-democrats-voted-for-taft-hartley/. 
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workers are union members.
103
 Economists disagree as to the cause of 
this decrease. Some argue the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, 
combined with a systemic political and corporate campaign to 
eliminate unions, has caused this significant decline.
104
 Others cite 
the changing composition of the workforce from a concentration of 
manufacturing jobs to the rise of service industries.
105
 And yet others 
argue the shift to a highly competitive US economy, in which the 
requirement to pay higher wages prevented US companies from 
competing globally, has led to a decrease in political and public 
support for unions.
106
 Whatever the reason, this trending decline in 
unionization has had significant effects on workers’ ability to utilize 
collective action to challenge workplace power imbalances.  
The effect of union decline might be most dramatic for women, 
who have been historically underrepresented in unions to begin 
with.
107
 As more and more women enter the workforce,
108
 the need 
for benefits traditionally associated with union membership, 
including healthcare and pension plans, becomes more salient for 
women, who are increasingly concentrated in low-wage jobs.
109
 The 
 
 103. Brad Plumer, Was the Decline of American Unions Inevitable? Not If You Ask 
Canada, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
ezra-klein/wp/2012/09/04/was-the-decline-of-american-unions-inevitable-ask-canada/; see also 
Organized Labor Fails in the South, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2014, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/02/17/organized-labors-future-in-the-south (describing the 
unexpected failure of the United Auto Workers to unionize a Volkswagen plant, despite its 
employer’s openness to union representation in the shop.). 
 104. KRIS WARNER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES., PROTECTING FUND. LAB. RIGHTS: 
LESSONS FROM CAN. FOR THE U.S. 11 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.cepr.net/ 
documents/publications/canada-2012-08.pdf. 
 105. Gary Becker, Will the Decline in Union Membership be Reversed?, BECKER-POSNER 
BLOG (Jan. 25, 2009), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2009/01/will-the-decline-in-union-
membership-be-reversed-becker.html (“The shift of jobs to smaller service-sector firms has also 
had a big impact since unions have been unimportant in these firms.”).  
 106. Michael Wachter, The Rise and Decline of Unions, REG. (2007), http://www.cato.org/ 
pubs/regulation/regv30n2/v30n2-2.pdf. 
 107. NANCY R. HOOYMAN AND JUDITH GONYEA, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY 
CARE: POLICIES FOR GENDER JUSTICE 66 (1995) (“Women have always been underrepresented 
in labor organizations. One primary reason for the lower numbers of women in unions is that 
historically, unionization has been highest in the blue-collar manufacturing jobs where fewer 
women are employed.”). 
 108. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 109. HOOYMAN & GONYEA, supra note 107, at 65 (“In addition to wages or salaries, fringe 
benefits such as health insurance and pension coverage are critical to ensuring a family’s well-
being. . . . [W]omen of all races are less likely to have this coverage than their male 
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decline of women in unions makes gaining access to these crucial 
benefits more difficult, and leaves women more vulnerable to wage 
inequality.
110
 In their book, Feminist Perspectives on Family Care, 
feminist scholars Nancy Hooyman and Judith Gonyea lament the 
decline in union membership, noting, “Membership in unions or 
labor organizations correlates with both increased wages and fringe 
benefits”—benefits that have traditionally eluded women workers.111  
Moreover, the costly increase in employment grievance 
procedures and resulting litigation
112
 should be no surprise. Where 
workers once turned to the union to address issues of workplace 
inequality and to bargain for better employment conditions, today, 
the decline in union representation ensures workers no longer have a 
reliable workplace forum for protecting their labor and employment 
rights.
113
  
III. CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS TO ADDRESS WORKPLACE 
GRIEVANCES 
In 2011, the Supreme Court heard the case of Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes,
114
 in which female employees of the retail giant Wal-
Mart brought Title VII
115
 charges against the employer in a class 
action lawsuit. The non-unionized female employees alleged that 
 
counterparts. . . . Women’s lower pension coverage is a result of their concentration in lower-
wage jobs.”). 
 110. Id. at 66. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Employment Litigation and Dispute Resolution, U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., http://www. 
dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/dunlop/section4.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) (“In the federal 
courts alone, the number of suits filed concerning employment grievances grew over 400 
percent in the last two decades. Complaints lodged with administrative agencies have risen at a 
similar rate: for example, in 1993, the EEOC received nearly 90,000 discrimination complaints 
from employees across the country.”). 
 113. For an extensive study on how unions work to raise wages and reduce workplace 
conflict, see RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984).  
 114. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). In 2000 Betty Dukes, a fifty-four-year-old Wal-Mart worker 
in California, sued her employer for sex discrimination. See Steven Malanga, The Tort Plague 
Hits Wal-Mart, CITY J. (June 24, 2004), http://www.city-journal.org/html/eon_06_24_04sm. 
html. Despite six years of work and positive performance reviews, she was denied the training 
she needed to advance to a higher salaried position. Id. Wal-Mart argued Dukes clashed with a 
female Wal-Mart supervisor and was disciplined for returning late from lunch breaks. Id. 
 115. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, prohibits discrimination 
by covered employers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
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Wal-Mart practiced unlawful sex discrimination in its promotion 
decisions, and sought back pay and punitive damages.
116
 The plaintiff 
class argued that “local managers’ discretion over pay and 
promotions [was] exercised disproportionately in favor of men, 
leading to an unlawful disparate impact on female employees.”117  
The Court ultimately ruled against the women plaintiffs, finding 
they had failed to meet class certification requirements.
118
 Because 
the plaintiffs failed to present proof that the company operated under 
a general policy of discrimination, they did not satisfy the 
commonality requirement for class certification.
119
 The Court 
explained, “What matters to class certification is not the raising of 
common questions, even in droves, but rather the capacity of a class-
wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive resolution 
of litigation.”120 Because the evidence presented regarding gender 
bias was considered merely anecdotal,
121
 it was impossible to prove 
that a condemnation of store-wide policy would provide relief for the 
entire class. Moreover, because of the variability of plaintiffs’ 
circumstances,
122
 the class failed to provide the required showing that 
all female Wal-Mart employees were subject to sex-disparity, 
 
 116. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548. 
 117. Id. 
 118. FED. R. CIV. P. 23, 28. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) govern 
certification of a class for class action lawsuits. For a guide to the FRCP, see 56 AM. JUR. 
TRIALS § 293 (1995). 
 119. FRCP 23(a) states, “One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder 
of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.” Further, class members must meet one of the three requirements under 23(b). The Dukes 
class claimed status under Rule 23(b)(2), which states, “A class action may be maintained 
if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 120. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 121. Id. at 2555 (“Respondents attempt to make that showing by means of statistical and 
anecdotal evidence, but their evidence falls well short.”). 
 122. Id. at 2557 (“[M]embers of the class: held a multitude of different jobs, at different 
levels of Wal-Mart’s hierarchy, for variable lengths of time, in 3,400 stores, sprinkled across 50 
states, with a kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and female), subject to a variety of regional 
policies that all differed. . . . Some thrived while others did poorly. They have little in common 
but their sex and this lawsuit.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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especially when the company itself had a policy against 
discrimination.
123
  
The Court also ruled that the plaintiffs could not go forward as 
any kind of class.
124
 The majority argued that because the plaintiffs 
were seeking back pay, it was not appropriate for the case to 
continue, even with a showing of discrimination.
125
 The Court 
explained, “[W]hen the plaintiff seeks individual relief such as 
reinstatement or back pay after establishing a pattern or practice of 
discrimination, ‘a district court must usually conduct additional 
proceedings . . . to determine the scope of individual relief.’”126 
Because back pay was integral and not incidental to the case, 
respondents’ class could not be certified.127 
In her dissenting opinion,
128
 Justice Ginsburg elucidated the 
consequences of the Court’s interpretation of the class certification 
requirements, which failed to provide the female plaintiffs with any 
protection. “Women fill 70 percent of the hourly jobs in the retailer’s 
stores,” she explained, “but make up only ‘33 percent of management 
employees.’”129 Further, “The plaintiffs’ ‘largely uncontested 
descriptive statistics’ also show that women working in the 
company’s stores ‘are paid less than men in every region’ and ‘that 
the salary gap widens over time even for men and women hired into 
the same jobs at the same time.’”130 Ginsburg noted the “gender bias” 
that “suffused Wal-Mart’s company culture,”131 quoting senior 
management, who referred to female employees as “little Janie 
 
 123. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. “The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence 
convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart’s ‘policy’ of allowing discretion by local supervisors over 
employment matters. On its face, of course, that is just the opposite of a uniform employment 
practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class action; it is a policy against 
having uniform employment practices.” Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 2561 (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361 (1977)). 
 127. For a more thorough discussion of the back pay distinction, see Grace E. Speights, 
Esq. & Paul C. Evans, Esq., Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Supreme Court Announces Stricter Class-
Certification Standards, WESTLAW J. EXPERT COMMENTARY SERIES (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/SpeightsEvans_Dukes_WestlawCommentary.pdf.  
 128. The dissent was joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 
2561. 
 129. Id. at 2563 (citing Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 222 F.R.D. 137, 146 (2004)).  
 130. Id. (citing Dukes, 22 F.R.D. at 151). 
 131. Id.  
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Qs.”132 One manager even told a female employee, “Men are here to 
make a career and women aren’t.”133 
Despite the likelihood that Wal-Mart’s female employees were 
victims of workplace sex discrimination under the law, class action 
litigation provided no recourse. Even Justice Ginsburg, who believed 
the female employees may have been certifiable,
134
 ultimately agreed 
that the class “should not have been certified under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)” because of the monetary relief requested.135 
The decision left many startled,
136
 and it became evident that 
addressing workplace gender-bias would become much more difficult 
for women following the Court’s decision.137 Even if the employees 
decided to bring individual lawsuits seeking damages, such suits 
could not challenge the pervasion discrimination that defined Wal-
Mart’s workplace culture.138 
The implications would be long-lasting.
139
 Feminist scholars 
throughout the country criticized the ruling, in one instance 
 
 132. Id. at 2564. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 2561 (“A putative class of this type may be certifiable under Rule 23(b)(3), if 
the plaintiffs show that common class questions ‘predominate’ over issues affecting 
individuals—e.g., qualification for, and the amount of, back pay or compensatory damages—
and that a class action is ‘superior’ to other modes of adjudication. Whether the class the 
plaintiffs describe meets the specific requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) is not before the Court, and 
I would reserve that matter for consideration and decision on remand.”). 
 135. Id.  
 136. See, e.g., Sarah Kellog, Wal-Mart V. Dukes: The Implications, DC BAR (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/september-2011-
walmart-dukes.cfm. “‘The Supreme Court’s recent decisions may make some wonder whether 
the Supreme Court has now decided that some corporations are too big to be held accountable,’ 
said U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D–Vt.), chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, at a June 29 
hearing examining the Court’s recent decisions affecting businesses. ‘You get the unfortunate 
feeling that many of the justices view plaintiffs as a mere nuisance to corporations.’” Id.  
 137. See Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34 (2011) (“To satisfy commonality generally, 
judges may now require a stronger causal connection between an employer’s discretionary 
decision-making policy and a disparity or adverse employment action. This shift will make it 
harder for employees relying on this theory to act collectively.”). 
 138. See Natasha Lennard, The Supreme Court Sides with Wal-Mart, SALON (June 20, 
2011), http://www.salon.com/2011/06/20/supreme_court_sides_with_wal_mart/.  
 139. Id.  
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comparing Dukes to Rosa Parks.
140
 Many cited Wal-Mart’s corporate 
structure as perpetuating a culture of sex discrimination.
141
 The 
feminist group Alliance for Justice argued, “If our Nation’s largest 
employer—with approximately 1.4 million employees, more than 
860,000 of whom are women, a large percentage of whom are 
women of color—can avoid liability for systemic discrimination 
across its nationwide chain of stores, [such] will undermine the equal 
rights of all women workers.”142  
Many worried about the increased difficulty of filing class action 
litigation in an employment context.
143
 Satisfying commonality 
would be more difficult, and the high standard of proof required to 
bring sex discrimination class actions would certainly deter women 
from bringing claims.
144
 How should women proceed in an effort to 
protect their workplace rights? Dukes appeared to be the latest step in 
a systemic corporate campaign to “roll back the clock and destroy 
many of the gains [women workers] made during the Civil Rights 
era.”145 
The decision also made it uncertain whether back pay would be a 
valid legal remedy for employment discrimination class action 
lawsuits.
146
 In the first Title VII case heard after Dukes, the district 
court judge exclaimed, “[A] unanimous Supreme Court reduced to 
rubble more than forty years of precedent in the Courts of Appeals, 
which had long held that back pay is recoverable in employment 
discrimination class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2).”147 Back 
pay is an important remedy for women who are subject to 
 
 140. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Wal-Mart Has Civil Rights against a Wall, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/29/134948498/the-root-wal-mart-has-civil-rights-
against-a-wall. 
 141. See ALLIANCE FOR JUST., WAL-MART V. DUKES: WILL THE SUPR. CT. PROTECT WAL-
MART’S DISCRIM. AGAINST WOMEN? 4 (2010), available at http://www.afj.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/11/wal-mart-v-dukes-report-final.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).  
 142. Id. at 1.  
 143. See Malveaux, supra note 137. 
 144. Id. 
 145. ALLIANCE FOR JUST., supra note 141. 
 146. See Malveaux, supra note 137, at 45 (“The Court’s unanimous conclusion that back 
pay was not appropriate for the type of class action certified in Dukes was surprising. This 
gratuitous decision effectively reversed almost a half-century of Title VII jurisprudence 
permitting back pay under such circumstances.”). 
 147. United States v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067, at 698 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2011). 
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discrimination, because it allows women who are fired or forced to 
quit as the result of unlawful sex discrimination to recover earnings 
they would have otherwise received.
148
 Moreover, back pay 
“encourages voluntary compliance with the law,” providing 
employers a financial incentive to prevent discriminatory practices.
149
 
When female victims are prevented from recovering back pay, the 
benefits of filing a class action lawsuit are severely reduced.
150
  
Despite the challenges women now face in bringing class action 
lawsuits, the potential benefits can be great.
151
 A number of recent 
class actions lawsuits, alleging unpaid overtime work hours, have 
promised meaningful settlements for low-wage workers.
152
 For 
example, the retail giant Victoria’s Secret, whose workforce is 90 
percent women
153
 and whose sales associates average $8.33 an 
 
 148. See Back Pay, U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/backpay.htm 
(last visited May 3, 2014). (“A common remedy for wage violations is an order that the 
employer make up the difference between what the employee was paid and the amount he or 
she should have been paid.”).  
 149. See Malveaux, supra note 137, at 45 (“Back pay compensates employees for earnings 
they would have received in the absence of discrimination. Back pay not only makes victims of 
discrimination ‘whole.’ More importantly, it encourages voluntary compliance with the law. In 
enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Congress made clear that back pay, like injunctive 
and declaratory relief, is essential to law enforcement. Because of the importance of back pay, 
there is even a presumption in favor of it when discrimination is established.”). 
 150.  For a more detailed discussion of the problems associated with bringing class action 
lawsuits regarding wages, see Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: 
How Courts Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 
523 (2012) (“Courts apply to wage rights cases an aggressive scrutiny that not only 
disadvantages low-wage workers, but is fundamentally incorrect on the law . . . [C]onditioning 
[29 U.S.C. § 216(b)] collective actions on certification motions proving commonality is 
incorrect.”). 
 151. “Class action lawsuits are designed to help streamline the legal process by combining 
tens, hundreds, or even thousands of potential individual lawsuits into a single class action 
lawsuit. This saves time, money and resources for all parties involved. For example, defendants 
only face a single class action lawsuit, the court system . . . has to only hear a single case, and 
plaintiffs can share legal fees among themselves, making it cheaper for plaintiffs to seek legal 
redress.” Robert J. Boumis, Metro PCS Unpaid Overtime Class Action Lawsuit Settlement 
Reached, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Aug. 27, 2014), http://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/ 
lawsuit-news/38337-metropcs-unpaid-overtime-class-action-lawsuit-settled/. 
 152. See, e.g., Palma et al. v. MetroPCS Wireless Incorporated, No. 8:13-cv-00698 (M. D. 
Fla.) (filed March 28, 2013) (where it is estimated that each member of the Class will receive as 
much as $5,314 after attorney fees). 
 153. See Ashley Lutz, What a Straight Man Learned from Working at Victoria’s Secret, 
BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/yes-victorias-secret-does-hire-
men-2013-5. 
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hour,
154
 currently faces a class action lawsuit alleging the company 
failed to pay employees entitled overtime wages.
155
 If the lawsuit is 
successful, Victoria’s Secret may end up paying workers a combined 
$73 million.156 Yet the move by employers to require that workers 
resolve employment disputes through mandatory arbitration has 
further undercut the efficacy of class action litigation.
157
  
IV. MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 
A. The Pros and Cons 
Since the early 1990s, a trend has emerged to keep the resolution 
of employment disputes out of the courtroom.
158
 Litigation can be 
avoided by utilizing alternative dispute resolution programs
159
 and by 
 
 154. Victoria’s Secret Stores Hourly Pay, GLASSDOOR (Sept. 17. 2014), http://www. 
glassdoor.com/Hourly-Pay/Victoria-s-Secret-Stores-Hourly-Pay-E13903.htm. 
 155. Karina Basso, Victoria’s Secret Faces $37M Unpaid Overtime Class Action Lawsuit, 
TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Aug. 25, 2014), http://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-
news/37916-victorias-secret-faces-37m-unpaid-overtime-class-action-lawsuit/ (“According to 
the Victoria’s Secret unpaid overtime class action lawsuit, ‘employees who work a closing shift 
routinely find themselves locked in the store at the end of daily operational hours and must 
await a manager to permit them to leave the store. Because this occurs after the employees have 
clocked out for the day, they are not compensated for the time spent under their employer’s 
control[.]’”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See infra Part IV.A. 
 158. See Employment Litigation and Dispute Resolution, supra note 112 (“Employment 
litigation is a costly option for both employers and employees. . . . Further, while the 
prospective costs of court awards do serve to deter employers from illegal actions, it is not clear 
that litigation protects all kinds of employees equally well. . . . Finally, even for those 
employees properly situated to file suit, the pursuit of a legal claim through litigation often 
proves stressful and unsatisfying. . . . These problems with the legislative model have led many 
employers, employee groups, and lawmakers to seek alternatives.”).  
 159. See, e.g., Robert M. Shea, Should Employers Require that Workplace Disputes Be 
Arbitrated?, MORSE BARNES-BROWN PENDLETON, PC, http://www.mbbp.com/resources/ 
employment/arbitration.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) (“A survey of more than 20 Fortune 
500 companies’ dispute resolution programs found that most employers who have implemented 
mandatory arbitration have done so in a way that makes arbitration the last step in a multi-step 
dispute resolution process. Most programs require that employment claims first be submitted to 
a human resources and/or management panel review. Claims that are not resolved are then 
submitted to mediation. Programs typically provide for the use of a professional outside 
mediator who will work to obtain a mutually acceptable resolution of the dispute. If mediation 
is unsuccessful, claims are then submitted to binding arbitration.”). 
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requiring employees sign an MAA as a condition of employment.
160
 
The use of arbitration clauses in employment contracts is regulated 
by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
161
 which requires parties who 
have agreed to arbitrate do so in lieu of litigation. Proponents of 
binding arbitration argue the method is less expensive, more 
expedient, and more informal than traditional adjudication, and that it 
allows parties to maintain a degree of privacy that is lost inside the 
courtroom.
162
 
Yet, the use of arbitration as an alternative to courtroom 
adjudication has been criticized,
163
 because of its inability to develop 
the law and provide relief for those outside the confines of the 
arbitration room.
164
 Further, because the employer dictates the terms 
of the arbitration and forces some of the costs on the employee,
165
 he 
essentially maintains that same position of strength that led to the 
employment dispute.
166
 Arbitration can be particularly tricky for 
women, who are already at a disadvantage in the workplace.
167
 
Individually, female employees possess less bargaining power than 
their employer counterparts, because of their “disproportionate 
 
 160. See What are the California Rules Regarding Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, and 
How Do They Differ from Federal Law?, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT. (Dec. 3, 
2012), http://www.shrm.org/TemplatesTools/hrqa/Pages/CaliforniaManadatoryArbitration.aspx 
(“Mandatory arbitration generally refers to an arbitration agreement that an employer requires 
new hires or existing employees to sign as a condition of employment or of continued 
employment.”). 
 161. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1925). 
 162. See Shea, supra note 159. 
 163. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
 164. See Rebecca Bielski, Legality of Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 
JURIST (Oct. 8, 2012), http://jurist.org/dateline/2012/10/rebecca-bielski-mandatory-arbitration. 
php (“Employees are waiving their right to a judicial forum, foregoing the impartiality of a 
judge appointed under Article III of the US Constitution and giving up their right to a jury who 
is chosen in a fair, objective and non-discriminatory manner. Furthermore, they waive the right 
to appeal an adverse verdict.”). 
 165.  Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 173–74 (2003) (“The employer promulgating the agreement 
selects the rules under which the arbitration will proceed. Some businesses are using arbitration 
agreements in an attempt to avoid class action law suits. Others impose at least half of the cost 
of arbitration on the employee.”). 
 166.  Id. at 175. 
 167. Cindy Hsu, Gender Inequality in the Workplace, HARV. INDEP. (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://www.harvardindependent.com/2011/12/gender-inequality-in-the-workplace-education-
does-not-equal-success-1201/ (“Despite the huge advances women have made within the 
education system, women are still at a disadvantage in the workplace.”). 
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location in temporary, contingent, and part-time jobs,”168 and because 
of the widely-held perception that, “sooner or later, women will leave 
[their jobs] to attend to family obligations.”169 This power imbalance 
is inevitably reflected in the arbitration room.
170
  
Working as a group, women can combat the power imbalance 
present in individual employment arbitrations.
171
 When an MAA 
prohibits class arbitration, the benefits women receive from 
collective action are erased.
172
 A female employee cannot distribute 
the burden and cost of asserting her rights, and she cannot benefit 
from identifying herself as one of a group of exploited workers.
173
  
Such was the case for Michael Cuda, when in 2008, he filed an 
unfair labor practices claim against his employer, D.R. Horton, Inc., 
for failure to abide by wage and overtime laws under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.
174
 Because of his relatively little bargaining power as 
compared to that of his employer, Cuda was forced to confront the 
very predicament low-wage workers encounter on a regular basis: 
challenge the status quo and risk termination, or quietly accept 
exploitation. For Cuda, that choice was made more difficult because 
 
 168. See Crain, Collective Action, supra note 2, at 26 (“Women are more vulnerable than 
men to cut backs and layoffs in hard economic times because of our disproportionate location in 
temporary, contingent, and part-time jobs . . . .”). 
 169. Id. (“[T]he vast majority of working women are crowded into low-wage, dead-end 
jobs that are structured around the assumption that, sooner or later, women will leave to attend 
to family obligations.”). 
 170. Hodges, supra note 165, at 179 (“Courts have found unenforceable arbitration 
agreements that fail to specify the rules and procedures governing arbitration or are 
overwhelmingly favorable to the employer.”).  
 171. Id. at 215 (“Class actions bring the power of the group to bear on the employer 
accused of discrimination or other violations of employee rights. The employees, combining 
their resources, are better able to combat unlawful actions by the more powerful employer.”). 
 172. See Daniel R. Higginbotham, Buyer Beware: Why the Class Arbitration Waiver 
Clause Presents A Gloomy Future for Consumers, 58 DUKE L.J. 103, 112 (2008), available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1375&context=dlj (“Opponents of 
class waivers argue that . . . by aggregating the claims of many consumers, [class arbitration] 
lower[s] the costs faced by each. A related and perhaps more serious problem with class 
arbitration waivers is that they potentially allow the drafting corporation’s misconduct to go 
unpunished. When individual consumers are unable to assert claims, companies are not held 
accountable for their misconduct.”). 
 173. See Crain, Collective Action, supra note 2, at 27. 
 174.  D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 1. D.R. Horton argued his employer misclassified his 
employment status as exempt from FLSA requirements. Id. See Exemptions to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, supra note 27. 
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he had signed an MAA waiving his right to litigate.
175
 Like many 
employees at the time, Cuda had agreed, as a condition of his 
employment, that all disputes and claims relating to his employment 
would be determined through binding arbitration.
176
 By signing the 
MAA, he also waived his right to “fashion a proceeding as a class or 
collective action or to award relief to a group or class of employees in 
one arbitration.”177 In other words, if other employees had similarly 
been denied their rights under the FLSA, they could not join Cuda 
and arbitrate as a class. 
The dispute Cuda experienced is demonstrative of the challenges 
many female workers confront each day in the workplace. Because 
women constitute a majority of the working poor in America, they 
possess the lowest level of bargaining power when it comes to 
negotiating workplace disputes. Moreover, because of their perceived 
and actual status as primary caregivers, women face an additional 
disadvantage in the workplace, as compared to men.
178
 It is 
worthwhile, then, to consider how the facts would have changed had 
Cuda been a woman.  
B. Women in Male-Dominated Industries 
Were Michael Cuda a woman, she surely would have been a 
minority at her workplace, given the male-dominated nature of the 
construction industry, as a result of occupational sex segregation and 
systemic stereotypes about feminine and masculine work.
179
 
Undoubtedly, her superiors would be male, and her opportunities for 
 
 175. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 1. 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id.  
 178. See Who are Family Caregivers, supra note 6; see also Crain, Collective Action, supra 
note 2, at 26 (“Gender disadvantage in the wage labor force is institutionalized through 
occupational segregation by sex and race and through labor market hostility to working 
mothers, whose cultural roles continue to include the obligation to serve as primary caretakers 
for children.”). 
 179. See Women in Male-Dominated Industries and Occupations in U.S. and Canada, 
CATALYST (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-male-dominated-
industries-and-occupations-us-and-canada (finding women represent 9 percent of construction 
industry employees in the US). 
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advancement would be limited because of stereotypes.
180
 Supervisors 
might expect Cuda to prefer a more subordinate or “friendly” 
position, because of her delicate moral sensibility.
181
 To appear 
competent and strong, Cuda might take-on additional responsibilities, 
going above and beyond her male counterparts to convince 
supervisors and coworkers of her sameness.
182
 She would likely 
perform “shadow work,” as well, serving as the primary caregiver in 
her home.
183
 Because of her minority status, Cuda would be more 
likely to experience sexual harassment or sex discrimination.
184
 And 
employers might deny her essential rights, such as pregnancy leave, 
because they already viewed her as a temporary employee.
185
 
Had Cuda been a woman, her potential claims would likely extend 
beyond noncompliance with the FLSA. As an individual, Cuda would 
have limited options for redress, and she might seek the comradery of 
her fellow workers. But because of her minority status, Cuda might 
be excluded from unionization efforts, because her interests would 
 
 180. Id. (“Catalyst research has found that talent management systems are frequently 
vulnerable to pro-male biases that inevitably result in less diverse employee pools. Because 
senior leadership teams, which tend to be dominated by men, set the tone for talent management 
norms, masculine stereotypes can creep into HR tools. Employees who meet criteria 
(potentially based on masculine stereotypes) are selected for promotion and/or tapped as future 
leaders and/or offered development opportunities. Because male-dominated industries and 
occupations tend to be particularly vulnerable to masculine stereotypes due to lack of diversity, 
women may find excelling in these industries or occupations to be particularly difficult.”). 
 181. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
 182. See, e.g., John R. Platt, How Women Can Survive in Male-Dominated Industries, THE 
INST. (May 6, 2010), http://theinstitute.ieee.org/benefits/products-and-services/how-women-
can-survive-in-maledominated-industries677 (A woman in construction “should take on 
additional responsibilities, be vocal in meetings or wherever decisions are made, be prepared 
with answers so she is not left speechless, and be confident in expressing new business 
ideas.”).  
 183. See Ivan Illich, Shadow-Work, 26 PHILOSOPHIEA 7, 8 (1980) (“This kind of unpaid 
servitude does not contribute to subsistence. Quite the contrary, equally with wage-labor, it 
ravages subsistence. I call this complement to wage labor ‘shadow-work.’ It comprises most 
housework women do in their homes and apartments, the activities connected with shopping, 
most of the homework of students cramming for exams, the toil expended commuting to and 
from the job. It includes the stress of forced consumption, the tedious and regimented surrender 
to therapists, compliance with bureaucrats, the preparation for work to which one is compelled, 
and many of the activities usually labeled ‘family life.’”). 
 184. See WORKPLACE HARASSMENT, supra note 5. 
 185. NAT’L COMM’N ON WORKING WOMEN, WORKING POOR WOMEN IN THE U.S.: NO 
WAY OUT 30 (1988) (Women are disproportionately located in part-time or temporary 
employment positions, which are most vulnerable to cutbacks and layoffs and least likely to 
have significant non-wage benefits.). 
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differ from, and therefore detract from, those of her male 
coworkers.
186
 But because of her unequal bargaining power, Cuda 
would nonetheless benefit from some form of collective action—
relying on coworkers with similar complaints to share in the costs of 
dispute resolution.
187
  
In attempting to arbitrate her FLSA dispute collectively, Cuda 
would rely on § 7 of the NLRA,
188
 which protects concerted 
activity—the right of an employee “to solicit fellow employees in the 
representation of rights for a legal claim under the FLSA.”189 Just as 
Cuda did, she would challenge the MAA as a violation of her right to 
engage in concerted activity. 
C. DR Horton and Class Arbitration 
After hearing Cuda’s case, the NLRB ruled against D.R. Horton, 
finding the class arbitration waiver violated Cuda’s right to concerted 
activity.
190
 The Board explained that filing a workplace grievance or 
a complaint as a group was protected activity, just like pursuing a 
grievance under a collectively-bargained for arbitration process.
191
 
The NLRB cited Brady v. NFL,
192
 where the Eighth Circuit held “a 
lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees to achieve more 
favorable terms or conditions of employment is ‘concerted activity’ 
under § 7 of the NLRA.”193  
Opponents of the Board’s decision, largely comprised of pro-
business interests,
194
 argued that the decision conflicted with the 
 
 186. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra Part I.B. 
 188. See supra note 16. 
 189. Hodges, supra note 165, at 208. 
 190. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 1. 
 191. Id. at 2–3 (citing NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 836 (1984), in 
which the Court observed “no one doubts that the processing of a grievance in such a manner is 
a concerted activity within the meaning of § 7” of the NLRA.). 
 192. 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011).  
 193. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2 n.4. 
 194. See Brief for Chamber of Commerce as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner/Cross-
Respondent at 1, D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013), available 
at https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/law/events/upload/14558140_Final-Brief-in-Horton-Filed-on-
Behalf-of-the-NCLC-in-the-5th-Circuit-with-ECF-4.pdf (“The Chamber is the largest 
federation of business, trade, and professional organizations in the United States. The Chamber 
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FAA,
195
 which provides “an arbitration agreement ‘shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.’”196 Moreover, opponents 
claimed, the decision violated fundamental principles of freedom of 
contract,
197
 representing “a full frontal attack on the [FAA’s] mandate 
that [arbitration] agreements must be enforced ‘according to their 
terms.’”198 Critics also noted that when DR Horton was decided, the 
Board was composed of only two of its five members,
199
 and thus, the 
Board did not possess the authority to make legally binding 
decisions.
200
  
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit did not dispute that class arbitration 
was indeed concerted activity; however, it found the NLRA did not 
create a substantive right to such activity, and that the right to 
arbitrate as a class was merely a procedural right.
201
 Furthermore, 
because class arbitration “makes the process slower, more costly, and 
more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment,”202 it 
 
represents 300,000 direct members and indirectly represents three million businesses and 
organizations.”). 
 195. Id. at 3. 
 196. Id. at 6 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
 197. See Luke Wake, NFIB Legal Center’s Winning Streak Continues with Three Victories 
in Two Days!, NAT’L FED. OF INDEP. BUS. (Dec. 5, 2013) (calling the 5th Circuit’s ruling, 
which overturned the NLRB decision, “a win for the freedom of contract”). 
 198. Brief for Chamber of Commerce, supra note 194, at 3. 
 199. 29 U.S.C. § 153 states, “The National Labor Relations Board . . . shall consist of five 
. . . members, appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 
Prior to the DR Horton decision, President Obama attempted to fill three vacancies on the 
NLRB. Because his nominees were perceived as pro-labor, a hostile Republican congress 
refused to confirm two of them. Obama went on to fill the vacancies by issuing controversial 
recess appointments. See Stephen Dinan, Obama’s End Run around Congress Draws Further 
Review from Supreme Court, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2014, available at http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2014/jan/12/recess-appointment-question-supreme-courts-first-c/?page=all. 
 200. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) states, “[T]hree members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute 
a quorum of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group 
designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof.” On June 26, 2014, the Supreme Court, in 
N.L.R.B v. Noel Canning, unanimously held that President Obama’s 2012 recess appointments 
to the NLRB were invalid. 573 U.S. __ (2014). However, NLRB Administrative Law Judge 
Jeffrey D. Wedekind has since continued to enforce the DR Horton decision, pending a 
Supreme Court reversal. See supra note 20. 
 201. See D.R. Horton, No. 12-60031, at 16. 
 202. Id. at 19. 
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conflicted with the FAA, “the overarching purpose of which . . . [is] 
to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”203 
If DR Horton is appealed to the Supreme Court, the NLRB will 
have to prove its decision does not conflict with the FAA, 
demonstrating grounds “exist at law or in equity for the revocation” 
of the arbitration contract.
204
 This would certainly be an uphill battle; 
in 2011, the Supreme Court heard AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, and 
held that class arbitration waivers were permitted under the FAA and 
the NLRA.
205
 There, the Court found that the FAA preempted a 
California court ruling that class arbitration waivers were 
unconscionable if included in consumer contracts of adhesion.
206
 In 
light of federal policy favoring arbitration
207
 and the fundamental 
policy that arbitration is a matter of contract, the Court in Concepcion 
reasoned that § 2 of the FAA, making agreements to arbitrate “valid, 
irrevocable and enforceable,” controlled.208 
Proponents of the NLRB’s position contend that, unlike 
agreements made in a consumer context, as was the case in 
Concepcion, “[t]he distinctive character of the NLRA is that 
it does vest employees with a substantive right to act in concert to 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 205. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 206. Id. See also Jeremy Wilson & William Lowery, Arbitration in New York, CMS 
LEGAL, available at http://eguides.cmslegal.com/pdf/arbitration_volume_I/CMS%20GtA_ 
Vol%20I_NEW%20YORK.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). The guide explains that § 2 of the 
FAA declares arbitration provisions will be subject to invalidation only for the same grounds 
applicable to contractual provisions generally, such as unconscionability or duress. Id. 
Consequently, most state law that disfavors the enforcement of arbitration agreements will 
be preempted by the FAA. Id. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) 
(establishing the applicability of the FAA to contracts under state law); Pereston v. Ferrer, 128 
S. Ct. 978 (2008) (holding the Act requires arbitration first even when state law provides for 
administrative dispute resolution).  
 207. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751.  
 208. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 at 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly emphasized that the FAA protects the right of parties to agree to resolve 
statutory claims in an arbitral forum “so long as a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute.” Id. Further, J.I. CASE Co. v. NLRB held that wherever private contracts 
conflict with the functions of the NLRA, they must yield to the Act. 321 U.S. 332 (1994). 
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protect their interests as employees.”209 Because Concepcion does not 
concern the NLRA or an employee’s concerted activity, it is not 
determinative of the issue.
210
 Moreover, the NLRB is entitled to 
deference in interpreting employee rights;
211
 however, in making its 
decision, the Fifth Circuit “failed to give any effect to the board’s 
analysis that the right to engage in concerted activity through class or 
collective action is a ‘core right’ under the NLRA.”212 
In arguing that the NLRA grants a core, substantive right, 
proponents point to § 1 of the NLRA, which “expressly declares that 
it is the national policy of the U.S. to protect the right of workers 
covered by the Act to improve their working conditions in a 
concerted fashion.”213 There, Congress wrote, “It is hereby declared 
to be the policy of the United States . . . [to] protect[] the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose 
of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other 
mutual aid or protection.”214 Employees bring class action lawsuits 
and arbitrate as a class for the same reason they engage in other 
forms of protected concerted activity: to level the playing field.
215
 
Moreover, it is § 7 “and its articulation of a right to concerted 
employee action that breathes life into the congressional vision of 
leveling the playing field for employees in relation to their 
employers.”216 Allowing low-wage employees “to act in solidarity 
with one another rather than as lone targets for possible retaliation, 
 
 209. See Lawrence E. Dubé, NLRB Asks Fifth Circuit to Rehear Horton; Panel Split Over 
Board View on Class Waivers, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.bna.com/nlrb-
asks-fifth-n17179885658/. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984) (holding it is the function 
of the Board to establish the scope of § 7, and that a reasonable construction by the Board is 
entitled to great deference). 
 212. Dubé, supra note 209.  
 213. Brief for Public Justice & Public Citizen Litigation Group as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner the National Labor Relations Board at 8, D.R. Horton, Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B., No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013), available at http://publicjustice.net/sites/ 
default/files/downloads/D.R.Horton-5th-Circuit-Amicus-Brief-of-Public-Justice-%26-Public-
Citizen.pdf. 
 214. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151). 
 215. Id. at 9. 
 216. Id.  
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[means] concerted legal actions are thus truly a form of ‘concerted 
activity for . . . mutual aid and protection’” under § 7.217  
CONCLUSION 
Women constitute a growing majority of the working poor in the 
United States.
218
 Occupational segregation by sex and a labor market 
hostile to working mothers have prevented women from earning the 
same level of independence and power as men in the workplace.
219
 
The decline of unionization and the onerous standards for class 
certification necessary to bring a class action lawsuit have made it 
increasingly difficult for low-wage women workers to collectively 
challenge institutional wage inequalities and other injustices in the 
workplace.
220
 Further, the costs of litigation and arbitration 
discourage women from bringing individualized complaints.
221
  
Class arbitration can help to remedy this power imbalance. 
Working collectively, women are more likely to assert their legal 
rights and to challenge male dominance in the workplace.
222
 One 
woman seeking to challenge an unjust practice cannot, by herself, 
effect broad structural change. Working as a class exerts pressure on 
a large scale, increasing the likelihood of wide-ranging institutional 
change that can benefit other disadvantaged employees. When 
women work as a group, employers are made aware that the group is 
a worthy adversary. Further, collective action allows women to pool 
their resources and distribute the costs and burdens that accompany 
any action.  
 
 217. Id. at 10. 
 218. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra Parts I.B, II, and III. 
 221. Hodges, supra note 165, at 215 (“Class actions bring the power of the group to bear 
on the employer accused of discrimination or other violations of employee rights. The 
employees, combining their resources, are better able to combat unlawful actions by the more 
powerful employer.”). 
 222. According to feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan, women place greater emphasis on 
relationships, causing increased interdependence among women. See GILLIGAN, supra note 36. 
When a woman is aware of what is possible through collective action, she is “like a new person, 
. . . not like that meek little person that worked in that office for twenty years and never opened 
[her] mouth[].” See Crain, supra note 2, at 31. 
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The increase in MAAs as a condition of employment has left class 
arbitration as the only platform from which women workers may 
collectively assert their demands. And the value of preserving this 
last-ditch form of collective action as a form of concerted activity 
under § 7 of the NLRA extends beyond legal precedent and 
traditional policy aims. Examining class arbitration through the lens 
of divergent feminist theories demonstrates the pivotal role class 
arbitration can play for all women. 
From a cultural feminist perspective class arbitration naturally 
utilizes a woman’s heightened sense of interdependence and virtue to 
build strong women-centered workplace relationships. Instead of 
betraying her role as a compassionate caregiver by challenging 
authority, a woman working in a group or a class might begin to see 
herself as fulfilling that role, caring for those women who do not feel 
empowered to speak-up individually. As such, the act of fighting 
inequality would no longer feel alienating or unfriendly, if women 
could see themselves as part of a larger group of exploited women 
wage workers, fighting the same fight together. 
From a liberal feminist perspective, the right to arbitrate as a class 
works to equalize power imbalances between women and men 
employees. The historical exclusion of women from unionization 
efforts and workplace representation has left women at a 
disadvantage when it comes to rights assertion in the workplace. The 
passage of Title VII and other equalizing legislation was a starting 
point for promoting formal equality in the workplace. But women’s 
issues still earn less attention than men’s, in and out of organized 
labor. Class arbitration, as a last-ditch form of collective action, can 
help women employees bring women’s issues, like equal pay and 
paid family leave, to the forefront. 
For radical feminists, collective action in the form of class 
arbitration is necessary to fight the dominance of capitalist structures 
in the workplace. Management uses its power to exploit the working 
poor—a group now dominated by women. Women wage workers can 
use their numbers to challenge the status quo, demanding higher 
wages and better working conditions. And as employees are routinely 
excluded from the court room by signing arbitration agreements, 
women employees can pool their resources in the arbitration room, 
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challenging not only patriarchy but all forms of workplace 
subordination, as a class.  
Protecting class arbitration is a feminist imperative, and feminists 
must defend the right of all workers to arbitrate as a class, regardless 
of the Supreme Court’s holding, should it review the ruling in DR 
Horton. Section 7 of the NLRA, protecting a worker’s right to 
concerted activity, was passed to rectify the power imbalance 
inherent in the workplace, ensuring no woman would be forced to 
face her employer alone, that no employer could take advantage of a 
single employee’s vulnerability, and that those of us intent on ending 
injustice could work together to fight for those who do not speak. 
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